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The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief for
Abusive Breach of Contract
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of extracompensatory damages for abusive breach of contract
presents a fundamental conflict.' Contract doctrine aims to facilitate ex-
changes. Extracompensatory damages are disincentives. These aims are
essentially irreconcilable. And traditionally the goal of facilitating ex-
changes has trumped any interest in punishing bad conduct. But there is a
lingering sense that sometimes a proportionate response to bad conduct
surrounding breach requires more than the traditional measure of damages.
At the edges of contract doctrine, two notable experiments manifest the
sense that some breaches demand more than compensatory damages. One,
the failed California experiment with bad faith breach, permitted the plain-
tiff to collect punitive damages for defendant's "bad faith" denial of the
existence of a contract.2 Criticism of the bad faith breach was rife. Lower
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. I
would like to thank Joe Perillo, Jill Fisch, Steve Thel, Clantal Thomas and Susan Block-Lieb for their
comments on drafts of this Article. Thanks to Ellen Johnson for research and editing work on this
Article.
I. I use "abusive breach" here to capture the various articulations of bad behavior surrounding
breach; e.g., bad faith breach, tortious breach, and willful, opportunistic breach. I use "ex-
tracompensatory" damages to connote not only punitive damages, but expanded (tort measum) conse-
quential damages of the type that some propose as a better choice than punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Cmenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery. 47 HATGS L.
585,585-86 (1996).
2. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158. 1167 (Cal. 1934).
overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
Courts and commentators seem to have used the terms "tortious breach" and "bzd faith breach"
interchangeably to describe the decision to award punitive damages for violation of the implied cove-
nant of good faith. See James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co.: Torious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Noninsurance Commer-
cial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L REV. 893, 894 n.12 (1986).
3. See, e.g., C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen. Commercial Bad Faith.. Attorney Fees--lot Tort
Liability-Is the Remedyfor "Stonewalling". 21 U.S.F. L REV. 419,499 (1987).
courts had difficulty drawing even rough boundaries around the concept4
and split over many questions.5 The California Supreme Court ended the
confusion in a 1995 decision scuttling the bad faith breach.6
Another experiment, allowing the award of punitive damages against
insurance companies for bad conduct breaches, is an enduring excetion to
the general bar on extracompensatory damages in contract law. The
model case is a denial of coverage on some specious pretext.8
With the failure of the California experiment, we are tempted by basic
tenets of contract doctrine to dismiss the insurance cases as singular aber-
rations in a doctrine that properly limits recovery for breach to what we
loosely call compensatory damages. 9 It is easy to understand the tradi-
tional response to breach of contract as a necessary element of our core
commitment to making the cost of contracting-viz., the price of breach-
certain and predictable.'0 This predictable exit price limits the risk of mak-
ing promises and encourages trading." Any escalation of damages for bad
conduct or otherwise would raise the cost of promise-breaking and thus
discourage exchanges. Because it is difficult to harmonize ex-
tracompensatory damages with this formula, courts typically refuse to
award punitive damages for breach of contract and narrowly limit conse-
quential damages to those that were easily contemplated when the deal was
4. See Freeman & Mills, Inc., 900 P.2d at 676 (Cal. 1995) (commenting on the confusion sur.
rounding bad faith breach).
5. See Robert L Rancourt, Jr., Note, Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.: Yes, The Seaman's
Tort is Dead, 27 PAC. U. 1405, 1406-07 (1996) (illustrating the disagreement as to whether to expand
the concept of bad faith breach to include bad faith assertion of a defense to breach and whether bad
faith breach was grounded on the implied covenant of good faith or an expanded view of tort liability).
6. Freeman & Mills, Inc., 900 P.2d at 669.
7. California generated one of the first such decisions. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). See also Susan D. Gresham, Comment, "Bad Faith Breach": A New and
Growing Concern for Financial Institutions, 42 VAND. L REv. 891, 892 & n.5 (1989) (tracking deci-
sions from the jurisdictions that followed the California courts in allowing tort recovery for bad con-
duct breaches of insurance contracts).
8. For a representative description of the insurance cases, see Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of
Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two Decades, 37 ARIZ. L REV. 1153 (describ-
ing liability for punitive damages as being triggered by outright refusals to pay, delays,
misinterpretation of records or policies for the purpose of defeating coverage, using threats to force
unfair settlement, falsely accusing the insured of wrongdoing, etc.). See also Douglas R. Richmond, An
Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL REv. 74, 74-76 (1994) (ex-
amining insurance bad faith law and litigation in both the third-party and first-party contexts); Chris
Michael Kallianos, Comment, Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing
Recognition of Exrtra-Contract Damages, 64 N.C. L REV. 1421 (1986) (describing factors that should
be present in insurance and non-insurance tortious breach cases before extracompensatory damages are
assessed).
9. See Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. L.EGAL
STUD. 405,409 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,389 (Cal. 1988).
11. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1994) (limiting
damages to those reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting encourages exchanges by allowing
parties to accurately gauge the risk of contracting at the outset).
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struck. 12 Compensatory damages, the argument goes, are as close to opti-
mal as we are likely to get.13 This tempts us to dismiss the insurance cases
as aberrations and to view'the California experiment as confirmation that
extracompensatory damages are not compatible with contract doctrine.
But have we been too quick to dismiss these experiments with ex-
tracompensatory damages? Are the insurance cases really so specialized
that they offer no general lessons about responding to abusive breach?
Was the California experiment so flawed that nothing useful can be sal-
vaged from it?
This Article shows that a unified analysis of the two efforts yields an
insight that delineates our capacity to respond to abusive breach. Consid-
ered together, they show that rules punishing abusive breach with ex-
tracompensatory relief are indeed viable so long as their impact is limited
to subcategories that are conceptually and practically severable from the
general pool of transactions. Severability is the core requirement of any
workable extracompensatory response to abusive breach. If we respect it,
then we can punish subcategories of abusive breach with aggressive disin-
centives. Failure to respect severability will violate the basic aims of con-
tract doctrine by leaking collateral risk into the general pool of transac-
tions, thus discouraging exchanges.
The severability insight yields several lessons that enrich our view of
damages for abusive breach. First, a general standard of abusive breach
exhibits the lowest degree of severability and is not viable because it ele-
vates risk in the entire pool of transactions. Second, we achieve the highest
degree of severability (and thus encounter the best opportunities to award
extracompensatory damages without leaking collateral risk) in categories
that key on the type of transaction rather than the manner of the breach.
For example, saying that we will award punitive damages for abusive
breach in insurance contracts (keying initially on the type of transaction
with abuse determined by violation of some intra-category norm) insulates
that risk from the general pool. But saying that we will award punitive
damages for willful, opportunistic or bad faith breach (keying exclusively
on the manner of the breach) elevates risk in all transactions. Third, we
can discern a large category of cases exhibiting a moderate degree of sev-
erability where a viable response to abusive breach depends on the process
of implementation. In that category, the legislative process has crucial
12. See REsrATiiENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 355 cmL. a (1979). Professor Farnsorth con-
tends that the first statement that punitive damages wiU not be awarded in contct law appeared in a
1909 English case. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 192 n.17 (2d
Ed. 1998).
13. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatoiy Remedies: An Analy-
sis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L. 369, 372 (1990); Ste= ShavelL Damage
Measures for Breach of Contract, I1 BELLJ. ECON. 466, 467 (1980). But see Willam S. Dodge. The
Case for Punitive Damages In Contracts, 48 DUKE L. 629, 654-55 (1999).
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advantages over the common law process.
Part II will show how severability is essential to mediating the tension
between our commitment to predictability of the cost of contracting and the
uncertainty introduced by extracompensatory damages. Parts III and IV
will consider what is required to achieve severability. Part V shows that
particular types of responses to abusive breach will exhibit differing de-
grees of severability that control the viability of those responses. Part VI
shows that the viability of extracompensatory responses exhibiting moder-
ate degrees of severability depends on the process of implementation-i.e.,
legislation versus common law.
Finally, it is not my aim to engage substantively the large body of eco-
nomic analysis arguing against the award of extracompensatory damages in
contract law or the numerous economic criticisms of punitive damages
generally. My effort here relates to those projects only indirectly, in two
respects: first, in the sense that it is indirectly critical of their predomi-
nately economic focus, to the exclusion of insights that can be drawn di-
rectly from the doctrine; and second, in its assumption throughout that the
decision to punish particular subcategories of abusive breach with ex-
tracompensatory damages is not just an economic one, but also must take
into account social, political, equitable and systemic considerations. How-
ever, except for purposes of illustration in Part VI, I do not make any gen-
eral or particular normative claims favoring extracompensatory damages. 14
My aim is only to show that any efforts to impose extracompensatory dam-
ages must operate within the limits that I set out here.
II. A PREDICTABLE Exrr PRICE AND SEVERABILITY
A prime tenet of contract doctrine is certainty and predictability of the
cost of contracting. 5 Traditional damages rules permit the promisor to
gauge with relative certainty the price of breach-viz., the risk attached to
promise-making. As Professor Farnsworth explains, our system of contract
remedies "is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach. Its
preoccupation is not with the question: how can promisors be made to keep
their promises?', 16 The aim instead is to encourage trading through en-
14. This Article will not engage the question of whether awarding extracompensatory damages is a
good idea in any particular case (with one exception used for purposes of illustration in Part VI). Some
of the commentators cited herein have argued that extracompensatory damages for breach of contract
always are a bad idea from an economic perspective. As suggested below, that is too narrow a per-
spective. The decision is not just economic, but also must take into account social, political, and equi-
table considerations. However, except for purposes of illustration in Part VI, I do not attempt to make
general or particular normative claims favoring extraompensatory damages. See 'fra text accompa-
nying notes 66-74 (making the case against the "late-pay scheme" for purposes of illustration).
15. See, e.g., Foley, 765 P2d at 389. See also Dodge, supra note 13, at 695-98.
16. FARNswORT, supra note 12, § 12.1, at 147.
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forceable contracts.' 7  One of the primary ways that contract doctrine en-
courages trading is through a low and predictable cost of promise-making.
Remedies for breach of contract provide obvious incentives to promisors.
Compensatory damages are not literally compensatory.' 8  Non-
recoverability of litigation expenses, and limitations on consequential dam-
ages, prevent the promisee from recovering fully the benefit of her
bargain.' 9 But the virtue of our traditional damages rules is that they give
the promisor the ability to gauge with relative certainty the cost of con-
tracting-viz., the price of breach. Promisees, we presume, are in a much
better position than promisors to predict and insure against the collateral
costs of breach.20
Alan Schwartz argues that the predictable expectancy measure of dam-
ages brings the cost of contracting to its optimal level. Supracompensatory
damages, he argues, would turn the contract into a gamble that informed,
risk-averse traders always would choose to avoid.2' The added risk of ex-
tracompensatory damages goes directly to the bottom line cost of the trade,
causing the promisor to charge too much and the promisee to pay too much
for the good or service.Y Some trades will be deterred altogether.
We see this concern explicitly in the evolution of California's bad faith
breach. As the experiment developed, some appellate courts extended the
concept of bad faith breach to include not only bad faith denial of existence
of a contract, but also bad faith assertion of a defense to breach. Other
courts resisted, emphasizing that such expansion of the bad faith breach
would inject a large dose of collateral risk into the general pool of transac-
tions.
In DuBany International, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.,u
17. Id. at 756.
18. Sykes, supra note 9, at408-09.
19. Id
20. Unpredictability of the exit price raises the risk of contracting and discourages trading. If
parties cannot gauge the fiscal risk of entering into a contract ahead of time., then the trade is more like
a gamble. There may be a chance to guess intelligently about the probability of breach. but the price of
breach is pure speculation. See, e.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.. 869 P.2d 454.
460 (Cal. 1994) (explaining that commercial activity is fostered by limiting contract remedies to dam-
ages reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting).
21. Alan Schwartz argues that generally rational and fully informed parties will prefer merely
compensatory damages. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 372. Schwartz might be right about basic incen-
tives and general preferences of traders, but there are other factors to consider. The decision whether to
respond to abusive breach with extracompensatory damages requires a social, political, and systemic
evaluation of the conduct and its interaction with the doctrine. An analysis like Schwatz's is only part
of that normative decision. See, e.g., the discussion of late-pay schemes, infra notes 65-74 and
accompanying text.
22. See supra note 14.
23. Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 235 CaL Rptr. 12. 21 (CL App. 1937)
(concluding that bad faith denial of liability under a contract %as enough for punitive damages to at-
tach).
24. 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct App. 1991).
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the court refused to expand the concept, emphasizing that such expansion
would mean that "any party attempting to defend a disputed contract claim
would risk, at the very least, exposure to the imposition of tort damages
and an expensive and time consuming expansion of the litigation into an
inquiry as to the motives and state of mind of the breaching party."25 This
would blur the line between contract and tort, trench on their purposefully
different measures of damages, and upset the predictability of commercial
transactions.
The theme appears again in Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co.26 There,
the court refused to extend the bad faith breach to punish bad faith asser-
tion of defenses, citing the need for predictability of the consequences of
breach and the destabilizing effect of a doctrine that had the potential to
turn every contract breach into a claim for punitive damages.2 7
Concerns about the loss of predictability substantially influenced the
ultimate decision to close the California experiment. In Freeman & Mills,
Inc. v. Belcher Oil,28 the California Supreme Court overturned Seaman's
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,29 emphasizing that the bad
faith breach violated two essential tenets of contract doctrine: certainty and
predictability of the cost of contracting, and the traditional emphasis on
compensation rather than punishment.3
D Ba Iy, Harris32 and Freeman take us part-way toward recognizing
the importance of severability in fashioning a response to abusive breach.
They confirm that a response to abusive breach that exposes virtually any
breach to the risk of extracompensatory damages is irreconcilable with the
central commitment to a predictable exit price.
But in their overall approach these cases fail to discern the full lesson
of severability. Indeed, the severability insight gets lost in the various
other rationales the courts offer to support their conclusions. The opinions
25. DuBarry Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 192 (Ct. App. 1991)
(determining that Seaman's could only extend to bad faith denial of a contract's existence, not a party's
bad faith denial of liability under a contract).
There was at least a possibility that the bad faith breach in its original configuration might have
operated in harmony with the principle of a predictable exit price. Initially it applied merely to the
arguably small and potentially severable set of transactions where one party contended that a deal had
been struck and the other unjustifiably denied it. However, extension of the idea to bad faith defenses
captured potentially every contested case, leaving traders to gamble on a court's conception of a bad
faith defense.
26. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (Ct. App. 1993).
27. Id. at 654.
28. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
29. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
30. Freeman & Mills, Inc., 900 P.2d at 674-75 (citing Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia
Ltd, 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1994), thereby reasoning that parties should be able to gauge ahead of
time the fiscal risk of entering into a contract, end thus, damages for breach of contract should be lim-
ited to those that can be foreseen at the time the parties enter the contract).
31. DuBarry Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 193 (Ct. App. 1991).
32. Harris v. Atlantic Ridgefield Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (CL App. 1993).
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argue, among other things, that extracompensatory damages require policy
judgments that only the legislature can make,33 and that extracompensatory
damages discourage efficient breach.34 Ultimately, there were so many
objections to the bad faith breach that the severability lesson was obscured.
The full insight is not apparent until we incorporate the experiment
with extracompensatory damages that undeniably has worked. Consider
now the insurance cases. These cases award punitive damages for bad
conduct accompanying breach 35 and yet they thrive, seemingly in harmony
with the core tenet of a generally predictable exit price. Here it seems we
have in fact reconciled inexorably conflicting themes.
The explanation is in the character of the cases themselves. The insur-
ance cases create an easily identifiable island of elevated risk that is practi-
cally and conceptually severable from the general pool of transactions
(where a predictable exit price remains essential). This characteristic (sev-
erability) is vital to any extracompensatory response to abusive breach.
The primary evidence of the insurance cases' severability is the ab-
sence of indications or even concern that the award of extracompensatory
damages in the insurance cases leaks collateral risk into the general pool of
transactions. The possibility is not even raised in cases considering puni-
tive damages for an insurer's bad conduct.36 Compare the concerns raised
by courts in the evolution of the California experiment. Recall the
DuBarry court's admonition that extending the bad faith breach to cases of
bad faith assertion of a defense would upset the certainty of the cost of
contracting on which the commercial world relied.
37
As the doctrine has matured, we have seen significant variation and
expansion in what courts are willing to deem bad conduct by insurance
carriers.38 Indeed, some now criticize that courts have permitted punitive
damages in cases that range well outside the boundaries of any conception
of bad conduct.39 But even here, there is no suggestion that this (arguably
unprincipled) intra-category expansion has disrupted general contracting
incentives. Compare DuBarry, where the court worried that a moderate
33. As I will discuss in detail in Part VI, the prior notice and potential for more precise delineation
of risk that is inherent in the legislative process makes it the preferred mechanism for responding to
certain categories of abusive breach.
34. See Freeman & Mills, Inc., 900 P.2d at 669; see also Dodge, supra note 13. at 698.
35. See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36. Criticism of the insurance cases has been wide ranging. See, e.g., James N. Fischer. Should
Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad Faith?, 72 'lx. L REV. 1447 (1994); Cathzo
M. little, Fighting Fire with Fire: "Reverse Bad Faith" in Firs.-Parry L'igation Imr'olIng Arson and
Insurance Fraud, 19 CAMIPBELL L REV. 43 (1996); Ellen Smith Pyoyr, Comparative Fault and Insur-
ance Bad Faith, 72 TEX L REV. 1505 (1994). But no one seriously contends that there is any danger
of spillover into the general pool
37. See DaBarly Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Indus.. Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181. 192 (Ct. App.
1991).
38. See, e.g., discussion in Sykes, supra note 9, at 412.
39. Id.at431.
2000]
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expansion to encompass a new aspect of bad faith threatened to leak risk
into the general pool.4°
Consider also the work of commentators critical of elevated liability
for breaching insurance carriers. Alan Sykes' thorough-going economic
criticism of the insurance cases is one place we might expect to see con-
cerns raised about collateral risk.4 ' Sykes criticizes that there are high error
costs (courts, he posits, are not very good at discerning abusive breaches by
insurers) and that the approach over-deters denial of claims, thus artifi-
cially raising the cost of coverage.42 But nothing in Sykes' analysis sug-
gests that the award of punitive damages in the insurance cases raises the
cost of contracting in the general pool of transactions. 4
The insurance cases endure because they only add risk to a discrete
subcategory of easily identifiable transactions. The decisions have pro-
duced such a buffer between these cases and the general pool of transac-
tions that even the arguably unprincipled expansion of punitive damages
beyond initially perceived categories of bad conduct does not add risk to
contracting in the general pool.
IH. UNPACKING SEVERABILITY AND THE RANGE OF SEVERABLE OPTIONS
To this point we can understand severability as a description of the
particular characteristics of a demonstrably viable exception to our stan-
dard damages formula. Severability accounts for the enduring vitality of
the insurance cases. The lack of it helps explain the failure of the Califor-
nia experiment. But to transform severability into a general prescription
for abusive breach we must determine what generally is required to achieve
it.
One reason the insurance cases are easily severable is that they arise
from a peculiar, highly regulated commercial subculture.45  This makes
them amenable to an enhanced damages rule governing an easily segre-
gated class of actors. The regulatory structure and barriers to entry ensure
40. See DuBarry Int'l, Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
41. Alan Sykes argues that supracompensatory damages are ill-advised in the insurance cases
because judges are not very good at identifying true cases of opportunistic breach and thus over-apply
the remedy to the detriment of all involved. Sykes, supra note 9, at 420.
42. See id. at 424-28.
43. See generally id.
44. This is not surprising. We know it certainly is possible to create severable categories of ele-
vated risk in contract law. Witness for example the treatment of usury loans. Rules penalizing these
transactions elevate risk in a variety of ways. In some jurisdictions the usurious lender forfeits both
interest and principle as punishment for lending above the usury rate. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dane,
390 N.Y.S.2d 249 (App. Div. 1976). This tends to confirm that it is possible to apply risk elevating
rules to discrete categories of activity, without introducing uncertainty into the general pool.
45. For a discussion on the nature of the insurance industry, see ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S.
RHODEs, HOLMES'S APPLEMN ON INSURANCE, 2D (Eric Mills Holmes ed., 1996) and JOHN ALAN
APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE (1981).
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that general traders will not fall into this class inadvertently. But is an
overarching regulatory structure crucial to achieving severability?
The best indications are that such a structure is not essential. While the
bad faith breach and the insurance cases are the most notable examples,
there are other more obscure experiments with extracompensatory damages
in contract law. These efforts suggest that severability can be achieved
outside the context of a regulated industry. Moreover, they show that sev-
erability has been tacitly respected in the common law for decades.
Historically, punitive damages have been awarded in cases of abusive
breach of contract by public utilities and marriage promisors." These ef-
forts are mere relics today, with both sets of cases removed from the ambit
of common law doctrine. It is difficult to discern what, if any, broad theo-
retical influences fueled common law courts to allow the exceptional rem-
edy of punitive damages in these peculiar cases. But it is evident that both
sets of cases were, like the insurance cases, highly severable, keying on the
type of transaction rather than the manner of the breach.
47
Other signals supporting the severability theme and confirming that a
background regulatory structure is not a prerequisite appear in the modern
doctrine of several states. At least four states currently allow punitive
damages where the breach of contract occurs in the context of a special
relationship 8 Indeed, one scholar treats the insurance cases as just another
in a list of special relationships where breach can result in ex-
tracompensatory damages.49 The other relationships "include [ ] carrier
and passenger, innkeeper and guest, physician and patient, and attorney
46. See 11 SM uEL WInflTON & WALTER ILE. JAEGEP, A TRATLSE ON TH LAW oF ConTRACrS
§ 1340 (3d ed. 1968). See Dodge, suipra note 13, at 636 nn.24-25.
47. There is little indication that the judges in the public utility and marriage promiser abusive
breach cases we consciously attempting to reconcile the risk elevating disincentives of punitive
damages with the risk minimizing incentives oftraditional damages See 11
48. William Dodge describes these cases in detail. It at 640-41.
In California, we also find special cases where extracompensatozy damages for breach are
keyed on the characteristics of the transaction. See, ag, Rogoffv. Grabowski, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185,
189-91 (CL App. 1988) (remanding to determine whether the plaintiff stated a statutory a of tion
under California Public Utilities Code); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bnk, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551, 554 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the relationship of bank to depositor was quasi-fiduciary, there-
fore bank could not reasonably claim non-existent legal defenses to its negligent disburseicnt of the
plaintiff's funds); Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129-30 (Ct. App. 1934) (finding recov-
cry in tort against an employer that breached its agreement to pay its employee sevrance pay on the
ground that the parties shared a relationship analogous to that of a disabUlty insurer cnd nsured). It is
suggested that the overruling of Seaman's Direct Buying m ov.v. Star, ard Ol Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal.
1984), casts doubt on the vitality of these cases. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bunk, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735,
741 (Ct. App. 1989) (suggesting that Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988), signals
the end of the "quasi-fiduciary" category of cases).
49. Dodge, supra note 13, at 648. In describing the peculiar md compelling characteristics of the
insurance cases, courts generally emphasize the special relationship betyeen the insurer and the in-
sure
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and client."50
These special category cases, both early and current, suggest that an
overarching regulatory structure is not vital to severability. More impor-
tantly, they reveal its core requirement.
IV. THE CORE OF SEVERABILITY
There is a lesson in what the special category cases do not attempt.
They do not attempt to sanction abusive breach through a general
standard--e.g., opportunistic breach-that overhangs every transaction.
Risk attached primarily to such generally described bad conduct inevitably
leaks into the general pool. Under such a standard, every trader in every
trade runs some chance of having his conduct deemed opportunistic.
Like the insurance cases, the special category cases key on the type of
transaction rather than the manner of the breach. It is transaction type that
signals elevated risk. Defining the category this way isolates risk so
clearly that traders in the general pool can ignore it. Keying on transaction
type rather than the manner of the breach seems essential to minimizing
collateral risk. Traders in the targeted category have prior notice of ele-
vated risk. Traders operating outside these areas are free to contract and
breach without fear that the manner of their breach will escalate damages.
This maintains predictability of the cost of trading in the general pool of
transactions.
V. DEGREES OF SEVERABILITY
We know that severability is achievable with rules that key on the
characteristics of the transaction and difficult to achieve through standards
that focus purely on the manner of the breach. But how should we map
the possibilities? Are we facing a constellation of random opportunities to
respond to abusive breach? Or can we impose more structure on the sever-
ability insight?
Let us first establish a fixed point that represents the lowest degree of
severability and the least viable response to abusive breach. It is repre-
sented by the recommendation from William Dodge's recent economic
critique, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contract Law, favoring the
award of punitive damages for abusive breach of contract." I raise this
point here not to criticize the proposal substantively (it is a response to the
numerous economic criticisms of punitive damages for breach of contract
and I am sympathetic to much of it). Rather, I use its ultimate prescription
to illustrate the most extreme version of the mistake we make by failing to
50. Id.
51. See generally id.
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respect severability and how easy that mistake is to make.
Ultimately, Dodge contends that punitive damages ought to be avail-
able for any willful, opportunistic breach.O In essence, Dodge proposes a
general standard of abusive breach that allows us to ask in every case
whether the manner of the breach warrants the award of punitive
damages.' This proposal exhibits an extremely low degree of severability.
As a reference point, it helps us to position the California experiment and
the insurance cases, and ultimately will help us to discern and position a
category of difficult cases where severability depends largely on the proc-
ess of implementation (Le., legislation versus common law development).
Recall our discussion of the California experiment. The nebulous bad
faith standard, combined with the myriad open questions left by the court
in Seaman's,M4 introduced into California contract doctrine a broad-ranging
notion of abusive breach. The broad trigger "bad faith"--that is, conduct
that violates accepted notions of business ethics55 -potentially captured a
great deal and gave little guidance about what conduct was safe from the
risk of punitive damages.
5
This was particularly true after some California courts expanded the
bad faith breach to include bad faith assertion of a defense to contract li-
ability.57 That failure prevented the concept of bad faith breach from
working in harmony with the paramount goals of reliability and predict-
ability of the cost of contracting. Appended to post breach activity like the
assertion of defenses, it cast a shadow over all contested transactions and
threatened to discourage contracting by raising generally the cost of prom-
ise breaking.5
8
Compare the Dodge proposal. Bad faith denial of the existence of the
contract and bad faith assertion of a defense are both narrower, less amor-
52. Id. at 699.
53. Id. at 633-34.
54. See, e.g., Rancourt, supra note 5. at 1426 (showing disagreement over whether it is grounded in
tort or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; whether it applied just to denial of contract
or bad faith denial of liability; whether a special relationship like in the insurance cases %as necessary).
55. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158. 1167 (Cal. 1984). In
the decision overturning Seaman's. the court in Freeman & Mills, Inc. highlighted this as a particularly
empty standard. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1995).
56. Responding to the question "under what circumstances will a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in a commercial contract give rise to an action in tort" the court in Sea-
man's asserted that it was unnecessary to decide this broad question. "It is sufficient to recognize that a
party to a contract may incur tort remedies when in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield
itself from liability by denying in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Sea-
man's, 686 P.2d at 1167.
57. See Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12 (Ct. App. 1937)
(concluding that bad faith denial of liability under contract was enough forpunitive damages to attach).
58. Plaintiffs pleading in good faith were able to state claims of bad faith breach in a wide range of
circumstances. See, e.g., Rogoff v. Gabowski, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185 (CL App. 1988); Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (CL App. 1985).
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phous standards than Dodge's willful, opportunistic breach. 59 Under the
Dodge formulation no promisor can guarantee going in that a subsequent
breach will not result in an award of punitive damages.6° All traders in all
contracts must account for this possibility in pricing, and, given the diffi-
culty of pricing the risk, some trades will not occur. In degrees of sever-
ability, we find the Dodge proposal at the extreme low end, followed by
the California experiment. At the other end of the spectrum, the insurance
cases and the special category cases exhibit high severability.
We have then a suggestion of a continuum; a non-severable and non-
viable general standard of abusive breach at one end (the Dodge proposal)
and a highly severable subcategory at the other (the insurance cases). They
are distinguished primarily by their triggers. The mistake of the Dodge
proposal is to key on the manner of breach-e.g., willful, opportunistic.
62
The entire universe of contract breaches is exposed to that designation. 63
The proposal injects collateral risk into the entire pool. On the other hand,
viable rules will respect severability by keying on the characteristics of the
transaction (e.g., insurance, marriage and public utility contracts) thus fil-
59. See Dodge, supra note 13, at 652.
60. At a more general level, this criticism is a familiar one. Considering the elusive question of
what comprises a violation of the implied covenant of good faith, Professor Summers argued that the
concept was so broad that it was nearly empty of substance. To give it meaning Summers created
subcategories of bad conduct that were "excluded" from the range of good faith performance and fur-
ther defined those categories with descriptive anecdotes. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of
Good Faith-Its Recognition And Conceptualization, 67 CoRNE.L L. REv. 810, 818 (1982).
Summers' attempt to give substance to the idea of good faith responds to the same problem that
afflicts the Dodge proposal. Like the implied covenant of good faith, a general standard punishing
willful, opportunistic breach is hopelessly broad and generates tremendous uncertainty about what
conduct will run afoul of the standard. See also Diamond & Foss, supra note 1, at 590-91.
61. Dodge acknowledges this criticism at the end of his article and offers a short response. His
rule, he contends, would not inject significant new risk or instability into trades because the promisor
can negotiate for a release from the promisee. Dodge, supra note 13, at 697. However this is two steps
too late. The value of a predictable exit price under current doctrine is that it drives promisor's think.
ing before he commits to the deal. It drives his pricing and ultimate willingness to make a promise at
all. The possibility of negotiating a release after the breach has occurred does nothing to affect this ex
ante calculation. And it would be an odd transaction indeed that incorporated an agreement ex ante that
set damages for promisor's willful, opportunistic breach. This is clear when we consider the range of
language we have used to characterize this type of breach. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d
368. 372 (Haw. 1972) (allowing the award of punitive damages "where the contract is breached In a
wanton or reckless manner as to result in a tortious injury"). See also Schwartz, supra note 13, at 369.
62. The California experiment made essentially the same mistake. See supra text accompanying
notes 15-44.
63. Traders must not be subjected to enhanced damages without warning. Within the category of
abusive activity, elevated risk is what we seek. But in the general pool our goal must be to maintain the
incentives that traditional contract damages provide. To do this we must give notice and then sever the
category deemed abusive from the general pool. A general common law standard of abusive breach
prevents this. It invites judges to evolve the standard to include new categories of activity. Nearly any
trade might provide the case through which a judge applies the general theory to create another cate-
gory of elevated risk. This possibility injects new risk into the entire pool.
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tering out collateral risk 64
With the insurance cases and the Dodge proposal as extremes on a
continuum, another question appears. Is it just a general standard of abu-
sive breach--one that overhangs every trade--that is scuttled by its failure
to respect sevembility? The original rendition of the California experiment
(which we can fairly position several steps inside the Dodge proposal) sug-
gests that there are other possibilities and problems between the extremes.
Consider now a mid-range of cases where we key on the manner of the
breach, not generally, but with specificity. Is it possible to sever and pun-
ish particular abusive practices and still avoid collateral risk in the general
pool? The next Part takes up this question and the problems it presents.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS AT MID-RANGE
Imagine a mid-range of cases consisting of a peculiar, abusive rendi-
tion of a common and typically immaterial type of breach. Here, we can-
not key on transaction type because the conduct is pervasive. Instead, we
are forced to focus on the manner of the breach-the very focus that we
concluded defeats severability in the case of a general standard of abusive
breach. But these mid-range cases present a different opportunity. We
would not characterize the violation with broad manner-of-breach designa-
tions like willful, opportunistic or bad faith breach. Rather we would key
on peculiar, explicitly designated acts. Might this allow us to create here
the same type of ex ante signal of elevated risk that we achieve by keying
on transaction type? The challenge is to create and seal off the category
through a sufficiently narrow and detailed description of prohibited activ-
ity. True, any trader might trip this type of standard. Thus, it poses a
greater danger of collateral risk than rules keying on transaction type. s
But if the violation is narrowly and precisely defined, it is possible that we
still can signal the risk ex ante sufficiently to create only a de minimus
level of collateral risk in the general pool.
However, achieving this precision poses a new problem: the uncer-
tainty inherent in the evolution of a common lav rule prevents the precise
64. The California experiment was problematic because, at best, it hinged on the vague concept of
bad faith. Guided merely by a mildly embellished rendition of bad faith, courts wer not guided to
protect any general categories of breach or any particular transactions.
65. The range of risk is obviously broader here. For example, for a rule keying on transaction type
traders will be able to determine quite easily that they are not engaged in a contract for provision of
insurance protection. That single, easy determination is sufficient to insulate them from the elevated
risk attached to the insurance cases. However, under a standard punishing late-pay schermas, as de'med
infra in text accompanying notes 66-67, traders are in danger of making decisions throughout the trans-
action that will trigger exposure to punitive damages. At mid-ange, traders still can achieve a good
degree of certainty that their conduct will not be deemed abusive, but they must be a%ar thiroughout
the life-span of the deal that their conduct might trigger a claim for extracompensatoy damages.
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designation of prohibited conduct that is essential in these mid-range cases
and becomes a significant source of collateral risk. For these mid-range
cases, the legislative process offers a better chance of developing an ex-
tracompensatory response to abusive breach with minimal collateral risk.
For a concrete illustration, consider a pervasive form of buyer's breach
that I call the late-pay scheme. Professional money managers have raised
it to an art form.6 It is simply the practice of dragging out payment to
vendors beyond the agreed payment date, and to the boundaries of vendors'
tolerance. In its abusive form, it is an intentional, continuing exploitation
of the remedial inefficiencies of the legal system that enriches its most suc-
cessful practitioners by millions of unbargained-for dollars per year.67 In
the European Community, calls to "outlaw" it appeared in the financial
press resulting in legislation aimed at stopping it.68
The case against the scheme is straightforward.6 9 It is an attack on the
66. Treasury managers call the practice "payment timing optimization." The scheme Is complex
enough that treasury management consultants do "brisk business showing companies how to Increase
cash by stretching vendor payments." Richard H. Gamble, Taking Advantage of Suppliers, 7
TREASURY& RISKMGMT., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 33.
67. The following passage illustrates typical late-pay practices and the advantages they afford to
corporations.
The Chief Financial Officer of a $500 million East Coast apparel manufacturer and
importer cut $250,000 from his company's annual interest costs last year by helping himself
to an interest free loan. How did he do it? Simple. He essentially borrowed from his ven-
dors by delaying his company's payment of their bills. But because he was subtle In his ap-
proach and resisted stretching the bill paying as much as he could, many of those vendors
have never even felt his hand in their pockets.
More brazen in the approach is the treasurer of a $700 million maker of consumer
products who routinely makes vendors wait an additional I1 or 12 days for the money they
are owed. Several of them have howled. But for this treasurer, it's worth the noise because
the short-term cash reaped from the delaying tactics has allowed him to reduce some debt
carrying a 7% coupon. That savings on interest payments means an additional $1 million
annually flows to his company's bottom line.
Id.
68. The Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act, 1998, c 20 (U.K.), 11 June 1998, gives
promisees a statutory right of interest and requires large frms to report the level of their late payments.
See also Barbara Roche, Why We Must Outlaw Late Payment, TIMES oF LoNDON, June 22 1997,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Ttimes File.
69. There are very few reported cases where plaintiffs have sought damages for the loss caused by
the late-pay scheme. With so little litigation over the issue, one might conclude that the market has
adjusted to the practico-that vendors generally adjust prices to account for the costs imposed by the
scheme.
But the idea that it is just factored in to the contract suggests a more level playing field than has
been proved. For small to medium sized local vendors competing against one another for accounts of
national corporations, it is false to suggest that the late-pay pattern of breach is factored in to the con-
tract price. The British Late Payment Act explicitly recognizes the potential imbalance of bargaining
power where the promisee is a small vendor. See also Janet Stites, Prospectus: Small Technology-
Based Companies Constantly Face the Problem of Getting Big Customers to Pay Their Bills on Thme,
N.Y. TIEs, Oct. 5, 1998, at C4.
Moreover, as a matter of process, if we accept that the market has factored in the pattern of late-
payment, how are we to respond to litigated cases under the current rules? Are we to ignore the express
language governing payment terms in favor of defendant's arguments that implicit in plaintiff's sale
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structure of contract law. The schemer exploits the interface between con-
tract rules and contract remedies and is successful only because of the costs
the legal system imposes on those seeking relief for broken promises.
In other contexts, we have responded aggressively to thwart similar
types of abuse.70 Examples of this are civil abuse of process and Rule 11
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those tools recog-
nize that the open door policy of our legal system empowers plaintiffs to
impose unjustified costs on defendants. They restrain this power by raising
the threat that the abusive plaintiff will be ipenalized for invoking the legal
process merely to exploit its inherent costs.
In the late-pay scheme, putative defendants exploit the same inherent
costs. The only real difference is the timing. The putative late-pay defen-
dant exploits the high costs of justice before litigation begins. He captures
unbargained-for benefits with the expectation that transaction costs will
make it inefficient for anyone to stop him.
There. are three basic renditions of the late pay scheme. The most
clearly abusive (class one) is the scenario where goods or services are ren-
dered in installments under a long term contract, and the buyer employs a
premeditated plan or system72 with the explicit aim of skimming unbar-
gained-for value from the deal. Here the scheme is manifestly intentional
and continuing. The class one late-pay schemer aims to maintain the rela-
tionship in the future even while siphoning unearned value from it through
price was compensation for the intentional and continuing late-pay breach that plaintiff knew would
occur? There are too many things wrong with such a view. Fust, it pushes us to evaluate subjective
intention while ignoring the objective indicators of intent. Second, it suggests that we should cotunte-
nance abuse of the remedial structure (exploitations of its inefficiencies) so long as the targets of that
exploitation (at least those with sufficient market power to protect themselves) have adapted. Finally, it
counsels against attempts to improve the doctrine.
The argument is also problematic where the target is an organization with layers of relatively
transient decision-makers. It is harder here for the experiences and expetations of the point parson to
filter up reliably to everyone who will make a decision contingent on the observable promises that form
the contract.
Moreover, it is just as likely that the targets of the late-pay scheme realize plainly that there are
no cost effective legal responses available to them. To the degree that damages are viewed as merely
the total amount overdue factored by the pre-judgement rate of interest, it is understandable that very
few putative plaintiffs have pursued formal legal action where the late-pay scheme is defendant's only
violation.
Again, one is tempted to say that the problem is a small one that gets just about the amount of
attention from the legal system that it deserves. Indeed. we commonly accept that in the case of sellers
of services, and less so for goods, there will be a bin of residual immaterial breach that is not cost
effective to pursue. But this is of course an incomplete view of the practice. When we incorporate the
total levels by which practitioners of the scheme are unjustly enriched through the scheme, it cannot be
dismissed as inconsequential.
70. Our general interest in removing errors and inefficiencies from the structure is a tritional
motivation for legal change that prescribes an aggressive response here.
71. A perfect mechanism would screen out warrantless cases at the outset. Unless we sacrifice the
ideal of equal access to law, the open door structure seems to be the best available option.
72. See, e.g., the mechanisms described in Gamble, supra note 66 and accompanaing text
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repetitive breaches. The class one scheme is the most easily identifiable
and easiest to police.
More complicated, and more difficult to classify as abusive, is late
payment in the repetitive contract (class two), i.e. late payment in separate,
similar contracts for goods or services delivered over a period of time.
73
The most difficult to classify as abusive is the isolated late payment (class
three). Isolated late payment is a common occurrence that overhangs vir-
tually every transaction. A rule that penalized it would violate our princi-
ple aim by making the exit price of virtually any trade highly uncertain.
A plausible goal is a rule that penalizes class one late-pay scheme with
extracompensatory damages, and ensures that class two and class three late
payers are exempt. 4 This is viable as a legislative enterprise. Pursued
through the common law it is much harder and maybe impossible.
The main concern is notice, and it breaks into two parts. If awarded
through the common law, extracompensatory relief will surprise the first
defendant. He will not have anticipated it and will not have priced it into
the deal.75 This is a general risk posed by the fact that common law judges
have the power to recognize new causes of action. But given the general
bar on extracompensatory damages for breach of contract, this risk is de
minimus.
76
The important notice problem occurs after the first case, in the form of
uncertainty about how far the new cause of action will extend. The first
common law case warns traders that the exit price of trades is now inde-
terminately higher. They are uncertain about whether this risk actually will
bite or how costly it will be. The fact that the rule will evolve through the
common law process is itself a significant source of risk. On any day in
any court, a common law rule penalizing class one late payment might
expand to other classes or to entirely new categories of aggressive com-
mercial activity. 77 That possibility of extracompensatory damages attach-
73. One example is the provision of temporary staff at buyer's request.
74. We might decide to lump class two late-pays with either class one or class three. I think it is
cleaner to place class two and class three together.
75. This is a general risk all traders face from the general knowledge that the law might change.
76. Paradoxically if courts acknowledge the importance of severability, it empowers and perhaps
encourages them to create sub-categories of elevated risk. This itself, may be enough to increase trad-
ers' perception of the risk of contracting. It is easy to imagine that moving from a regime where the
generally controlling rule is compensatory damages only, to one where extracompensatory damages are
authorized in discrete severable sub-categories (even where that discretion is exercised rarely) will
change traders' perceptions of the cost of promise-making to at least a small degree. However, that is
not much different from the current state of affairs. Traders in most jurisdictions operated in the
shadow of precedent that confirms the possibility of punitive damages for breach of contract in amor-
phously defined egregious cases where the court also can push the breach into the category of tort. See
RIEsATEMENT (SECOND) of CoNTRAcTs § 355 (1981) (stating that punitive damages are recoverable
if "the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable").
77. The evolution of the California experiment is a good example of this. Consider the message
sent by the conflicting opinions in DuBarry International, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 282
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ing unpredictably to done deals without notice injects unacceptable risk
into the entire pool of transactions; it prevents us from awarding ex-
tracompensatory damages in harmony with the prime tenant of a predict-
able exit price. 8
If we are to key on the manner of the breach with particularity suffi-
cient to sever the category from the general pool, we must ensure that the
boundaries hold. To avoid collateral risk, the offense must be defined with
certainty, reliably into the future, with adequate notice before the rule ex-
pands to capture new circumstances? 9
Legislation is more likely to achieve this for reasons inherent in the
process.8s The inherent fluidity of common law rules invites porous,
evolving boundaries and thus expanding risk-precisely the collateral risk
that we must avoid. After the first common law case awarding ex-
tracompensatory damages, given the uncertainty of its life-span and vigor,
direct and collateral risk to traders engaged in similar activity rises dra-
matically; the ability of traders to assess the boundaries of this new risk is
minimal until the doctrine matures.
Legislation can produce immediately something much closer to a ma-
ture structure for levying extracompensatory damages in discrete cases81
In addition to pre-implementation notice that is vital to severability, the
legislative process can fix more solid boundaries around the proscribed
Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1991) (determining that Searran's could only extend to bad faith denial of a
contract's existence, not a party's bad faith denial of liability under a contract) and Multiplex Inur.
Agency, Inc. v. CaL Life Insur. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (CL App. 1987) (concluding that bd faith denial
of liability under a contract was enough for punitive damages to attach).
78. Witness the California experiment, which initially keyed on fairly discrete activity-bad faith
denial of the existence of the contract-and expanded to include activity-b-ad faith asertion of do-
fenses--that introduced uncertainty to a much larger category of activity. See sryra text accompamying
notes 14-34.
79. One arguable drawback of course is that traders will be able to come right to the line safely,but
this is the cost of minimizing collateral risk. A common law rule on the other hand, would not permit
such a close approach. The uncertainty of what the nextjudge will do with a common law rule cautions
the risks aver tgive the activity wide berth; that is it overdeters,hich also means it leaks collatral
risk.
80. The legislative process might not produce better substantive rules. Indeed they might be worse.
But this merely underscores the fact that at middle-degraes ofseverabillty (i.e, rules keying on peculiar
styles of breach) process is paramount For example, legislators might be more prone than judges to
make war on "abusive" commercial practices. They might decide to punish a variety of discrete pr.c-
tices that they deem abusive breach. So long as they fashion adequate initial boundaries, the pre-
enforcement notice and non-retroactivity of the process will insulate the general pool of tramsactions
from risk.
81. In countless categories of cases a clear legislative statement will cause courts to defer to legis-
lative schemes as mature structures that permit little room for interpretation. Sea, for example, the
variety of cases stemming from OCvron USA., Ina. v. Natural Resources Defese Co,.e:4 Ir.a, 467
U.S. 837 (1994). See generally, NORMAN SiNGER, SutmRLAND STATUTMRY CoNSTRUCnoN (5th ed.
1994). Whether this is purely a finction ofjudicial philosophy or not, the point remains that the legis-
lative process allows development of a mature regulatory scheme more quickly than dots the common
law process.
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conduct. There will be uncertainty, but dramatically less than would ap-
pear through the slow and unpredictable process of common law
evolution.82  The long lead time, pre-enforcement notice and non-
retroactivity inherent in legislative rules allows traders to rely upon an es-
tablished boundary between class one and class two/three late pays, with-
out fear that theirs will be the case where a common law judge breaks the
seal.83
We find then at mid-range that severability is degraded by the common
law process. The capacity of any category to expand through the common
law process generates the collateral risk that we must avoid. If we choose
to award extracompensatory damages at mid-range, we also must choose
the legislative mechanism.
VII. CONCLUSION
Any response to bad faith breach must occur in harmony with the core
commitment to a predictable exit price. The lesson from the failure of the
California experiment and the vitality of the insurance cases, is that we can
pitch an extracompensatory response to abusive breach in harmony with
this core commitment so long as that response is limited to discrete and
severable categories of breach.
Extracompensatory damages rules that key on the type of transaction
rather than the manner of the breach exhibit the highest degree of sever-
ability and thus the highest degree of viability. Broad standards that key
on the manner of the breach, generally described, exhibit a low degree of
severability and the lowest degree of viability. Rules that key explicitly
and precisely defined types of breach achieve a moderate degree of sever-
ability and are viable when pursued through legislation.
We will likely continue to debate what constitutes abusive breach as a
normative matter. But in practical terms, we cannot develop viable re-
sponses to categories of abusive breach without considering and respecting
severability.
82. A rough example of the virtues of legislative process are usury laws. The relatively bright line
boundaries governing usury permit general lending transactions to continue unimpaired by the threat of
elevated damages. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dane, 390 N.Y.S.2d 249 (App. Div. 1976) (holding the
usurious lender forfeits both interest and principle as punishment for lending above the usury rate).
Contrast the tangled web of common law rules that attach additional risk to contracts with minors. See
discussion in Pettit v. Liston, 191 P. 660 (Or. 1920).
83. This of course assumes an adequate job of legislation to design the boundaries and minimize
ambiguity. It also assumes a strong legislative message about the systemic importance of the boundary,
sufficient to discourage activist judges.
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